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  Abstract: This article deals with the intricate ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, while focusing 
on the thorny issues of Euroscepticism and democratic deficit within the European Union in the current 
institutional  context.  The  study  is  based  on  a  wide  research  endeavour,  whose  purpose  has  been  to 
encompass multiple points of view on the future of the European Union, seen from the perspective of the 
Treaty of Lisbon and its reception in all member states. These viewpoints include the ones found in the 
speciality literature, as well as in the press that published representative articles during the debates on the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Useful attempts are made in order to classify the member states of the EU 
according to various relevant criteria in their attitude germane to the ratification of the Treaty, so as to 
outline  new  waves  of  Euroscepticism,  opt-outs  and  criticism.  Apart  from  an  institutional  and  a  legal 
perspective, this study presents a large number of political, national and even cultural aspects encountered 
in attitudes and courses of action pertaining to the future of European Construction, seen through the eyes of 
the reform process carried out by the latest EU major legal document. 
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1.  EUROSCEPTICISM AND DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: FACTORS IN THE 
RATIFICATION PROCESS 
   
Given  the  traumatizing  experience  of  the  failed  ratification  of  a  major  European  reform 
document back in 2005, the European Union’s political body could certainly not afford another 
failure of this kind, after the intricate reflection period that led to the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty, a 
compromise  meant  to  overcome  the  dysfunctional  institutional  framework  after  the  2004 
enlargement  (de  Poncins,  2008,  p.  192).  At  the  moment  of  signing  the  Treaty,  on  the  18
th  of 
                                                             
1 Investing in people! Ph.D. scholarship, Project co-financed by the SECTORAL OPERATIONAL PROGRAM FOR 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 2007 – 2013 Priority Axis 1. "Education and training in support for growth 
and development of a knowledge based society" Key area of intervention 1.5: Doctoral and post-doctoral programs in 
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KNOWLEDGE BASED SOCIETY” Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.  
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December 2007, the expected date for it to come into force was the 1
st of January 2009, which 
appeared consistent with the average duration of this process for any major Treaty. 
Nevertheless, the ratification course would not go as smoothly as expected, as one member 
state was required by its internal regulations to hold a referendum on the matter, namely Ireland, 
which eventually led to the rejection of the document, in a déjà vu of what had happened in the 
summer of 2005. This paper attempts to argue that Euroscepticism played a significant role in the 
sinuous ratification process, as did the issue of the democratic deficit within the EU. The first of the 
two terms, Euroscepticism, refers to the opposition expressed by certain groups of people towards 
the process of European integration and, in particular, towards the deepening of this process. As in 
the case of any other supranational construction process, the rise of an opposing current is normal 
and, to a certain extent, it is the expression of a democratic divergence of opinions. However, the 
political forces that drive the Eurosceptical trend are usually counterproductive and often trigger 
memories of past totalitarianism, if one refers to extreme right-wing political groups, which take the 
national criterion all the way to the top of their argumentation. A Eurosceptical  attitude is often 
attached to a nationalist sentiment, as in the case of Czech President Vaclav Klaus, who appealed to 
historic arguments and national traumas from the Second World War to block the signing of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, albeit a contrary opinion from the part of his government and people. 
One trustworthy instrument to assess the fluctuations in the level of Euroscepticism across 
Europe is without a doubt the Eurobarometer. This periodical survey should be used as an alarm 
signal for identifying the situation of the crisis of values within the European Union, in the eyes of 
its citizens, so as to come up with viable solutions to crucial problems such as legitimacy and 
representativeness (Păun, 2007). Having said this, it has to be pointed out that the latest available 
figures, dating back to 2009, are less than worrying for the European Union, with half of its citizens 
sustaining  their  respective  countries’  membership,  although  this  percentage  is  far  from  being 
uniformly spread amongst member states. As a general trend, the original six countries that founded 
the  Community  still  benefit  from  steady  support  for  the  integration  process,  with  peak  values 
recorded in Luxembourg and the Netherlands, while other experienced members, such as Spain or 
the Republic of Ireland, are equally well positioned with regard to European construction (Standard 
Eurobarometer 71. Table of Results, 2009, p.91-93). 
On the other hand, Eurosceptical political parties and  virulent  nationalist discourses  have 
maintained a dangerously low level of support for EU membership in the ever-sceptical United 
Kingdom, a champion of opposition and opt-outs in the integration course, whose newly-elected 
Conservative-Liberal-Democratic  Government  shows  less  European  perspective  than  its  Labour 
predecessor. With less than a third of its population referring to EU membership as a positive factor,  
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Britain has been and remains a subject worthy of analysis in any discussion on Euroscepticism and 
its  impact.  This  being  said,  the  Eurobarometer shows  similar  worrying  tendencies  in  a  part  of 
Europe that longed for European integration until just a while ago (and part of it still does), namely 
Central and Eastern-Europe. With the rise of right-wing political  forces and an ever  increasing 
economic crisis, massive social protests and civic unrest, countries such as Hungary and Latvia are 
undergoing a decrease in the support for European integration, felt at the level of their citizens and 
in the political discourse. Partly due to the tendency of nationalist politicians to blame everything 
that  goes  wrong  within  a  country  on  the  so-called  technocratic  process  in  Brussels,  the 
Eurosceptical  attitude  in  this  part  of  Europe  is  increasing  slowly  but  surely,  with  potentially 
dangerous consequences in the near future. The question asked by the Eurobarometer which led to 
these conclusions is whether citizens feel their country has benefitted from European integration, to 
which only about half of British, Hungarian or Latvian citizens answered affirmatively (Standard 
Eurobarometer 71. Table of Results, 2009, p. 95-96). To expand the area, it has to be said that, 
while Romanians are still favourable to European Union membership, Bulgarians tend to align their 
opinions to those of the Eurosceptical nations mentioned above and blame the Community for the 
poor economic situation of the country, fuelled by a dangerously active organized crime. 
Another useful Eurobarometer instrument used to monitor the sceptical feeling across Europe 
towards European integration is the trust of European citizens in the common institutions, especially 
the Parliament, Commission and Central Bank. As expected, the first of the three benefits from 
more consistent support, with just about half of European citizens expressing their confidence in the 
parliamentary  assembly,  chiefly  in  Central  and  East-European  states.  The  interpretation  of  this 
result can be regarded as ambivalent, as in this part of the continent, the population tends to lose 
confidence  in  national  legislative  bodies,  which  fall  victims  of  more  and  more  allegations  of 
corruption and inefficiency, fuelled by a bloodthirsty media. From this perspective, the support for 
the  European  Parliament  should  be  considered  encouraging,  as  these  citizens  may  well  find  a 
suitable alternative for popular representation in the EP, an institution that has been struggling since 
its creation to gain more credibility and legitimacy on a supranational scale. On the other hand, the 
British, who take great pride in their Parliament and democracy, tend to exhibit the lowest support 
for the European Parliament of all member states, with just a little over one Briton in five having 
confidence  in  it.  This  attitude  partly  springs  from  the  allegiance  of  the  British  nation  to  its 
traditional institutions, relying on an unequaled political tradition in Europe, which, if combined 
with the nature of the British conservative spirit, makes it hard for this nation to share their fidelity 
with much more recently created institutions - not to mention supranational ones.  
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As expected, the level of trust in the executive body of the European Union, namely the 
Commission, is slightly lower than the one in the Parliament (Standard Eurobarometer 71. Table of 
Results,  2009,  p.  110-112),  an  attitude  that  is  consistent  with  the  political  tradition  across 
democratic  Europe,  which  makes  executive  institutions  more  prone  to  attract  criticism  than 
legislative ones, whose visibility is less prominent in the case of measures taken to directly affect 
the population (although in reality, it should be the other way around) (Doutriaux and Lequesne, 
Paris, 2008, p.62-63). Furthermore, the confidence expressed by Europeans in the Central Bank of 
Frankfurt is equally inferior to that in the European Parliament, especially in a moment of doubt for 
the future of the single European currency, the euro (Doutriaux and Lequesne, Paris, 2008, p. 114-
117). Part of the economic elite has indeed publically expressed its concern as to the fact that states 
should  not  give  up  some  of  their  most  important  economic  control  factors  in  favour  of  a 
supranational institution, thus relinquishing a share of its national sovereignty. 
Even with this opposition fuelling Euroscepticism on an ever wider scale, it is to be noticed 
that the same Eurobarometer survey indicates beyond the shadow of a doubt that the dominant 
attitude towards European construction is either positive, or, in the worst case scenario, neutral, 
with 46% of European citizens adopting a favourable view of it, 36% taking on a neutral one and no 
more than 16% painting a negative picture in this respect (Doutriaux and Lequesne, Paris, 2008, p. 
130-133). 
One can state beyond the shadow of a doubt that the country where Euroscepticism flourishes 
most even at present is Great Britain, where its history dates back to the admission of the UK to the 
European Community in 1973 (Branigan, 2007). The British elections have always been a good 
occasion for such attitudes to be publically expressed, exploiting a population prone to advocate 
against the European Union. For instance, the UK Independence Party can be referred to as the most 
powerful Eurosceptic party across the EU, something that its leaders were skilled in exploiting 
during the latest elections for the European Parliament, in 2009, when the party was ranked second, 
after the governing Labour Party, with 16.5% of the votes.
1 This proves in fact that such is the 
opposition towards European construction in Britain that the voters switch sides from the national 
elections to the European ones to support the main principle, and arguably the only strong one, of 
the UKIP, which is withdrawal from the European Union. If one adds the significant number of 
votes gathered by another Eurosceptical and far -right British party, namely the British National 
Party, at the same elections, then it is to be noticed that a worrying 28% of the total votes cast in 
Britain went to parties that are frenetically opposed to UK membership of the European Union. Not 
                                                             
1 European Election 2009: UK Results, BBC News, 8 June 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/elections/euro/09/html/ukregion_999999.stm.  
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far from these attitudes is the one exhibited by current Prime Minister David Cameron, who, at a 
time when the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was endangered by Polish and Czech opposition, 
campaigned for a referendum on the Treaty, in the event that his party was to win the elections. 
Luckily for the reform process, the Treaty overcame these hurdles and came into force before the 
UK elections, which ultimately led to a right-wing coalition, between the Conservatives and the 
Liberal-Democrats, with no spectacular European affinities. 
Moreover, opposition regarding European construction was paradoxically cultivated within a 
common  institution,  namely  the  European  Parliament,  a  phenomenon  which  is  specific  to  the 
tolerant and democratic nature of the EU. The parliamentary group called “Europe of Democracies 
and Diversities”, created in 1999, later to be called “Europe of Freedom and Democracy”, had at the 
core of its doctrine an obvious Eurosceptical attitude. In fact, perhaps the greatest achievement of 
this political group so far has been the repellence of the Constitutional Treaty, which its members 
advocated from within the European Parliament itself. However, the latest parliamentary elections 
show a tendency to lower citizens’ support for these Eurosceptical parties, which now have only 32 
members, from 9 out of the 27 member states.
1 
 As far as the democratic deficit is concerned, it is a widespread belief throughout the 
European Union that its institutional layout does not represent the European citizens in a coherent 
manner, nor does it benefit from sufficient legitimacy (Degryse, 2007, p.252-253). This deficit is in 
fact  a  structural  one,  given  that  the  EU  is  neither  a  transnational  organization  nor  an 
intergovernmental  one  -  it  is  a  mix  of  the  two  apparently  opposing  principles,  with  a  unique 
decision making mechanism and representation formula (Păun, 1999, p.167). This problem has been 
around since the deepening of European integration, in the 1970s, when the first accession wave 
took place, and resulted in a permanent attempt to increase the level of legitimacy of the common 
institutions. For example, the decision that the European Parliament’s members should be elected 
directly  by  the  citizens,  by  universal  ballot,  came  in  1979  as  a  response  to  this  allegation  of 
insufficient representation (Ghica et al., 2007, p.64-65). Ever since, the Parliament’s prerogatives 
have  steadily  been  widened,  with  ever  more  provisions  to  expand,  for  instance,  codecision 
mechanisms  to  more  and  more  domains,  included  into  the  Treaties.  Hence,  the  structure  and 
organization of the European Parliament has become close to the one of a national parliament, 
except for the fact that European Members of Parliament do not benefit from the right to propose 
Community Laws, a prerogative that is currently reserved for the European Commission. 
                                                             
1 Europe of Freedom and Democracy website, http://www.efdgroup.eu/the-group/national-delegations.html, accessed 
18 June 2010.  
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What is true is that the turnout to European Parliament voting is still fairly low across Europe, 
possibly due to the fact that the average citizens feel they have little in common with this institution, 
although the electoral campaigns sometimes focus on quite punctual European issues that directly 
concern citizens. Other times, these campaigns do little more than to reiterate the same internal 
disputes as in the case of the national elections. Nevertheless, the reform process, in light of the 
Constitutional Treaty and the more recent Lisbon Treaty, has aimed at introducing further reforms 
that are meant to bring European citizens closer to the EU. Such measures include: a greater role 
given to national parliaments in the decision making process, the right to citizens’ initiative (if one 
million  of  them  sign  for  a  legal  proposal,  under  certain  conditions),  the  public  character  of 
European Council meetings, extended use of codecision - renamed ordinary legislative procedure - 
and the acceptance of the subsidiarity principle as a fundament of European construction.
1 The 
latter stipulated that any community decision shall be taken at the lowest level possible, so as to 
involve the citizens that are likely to be affected by it (Millon-Delsol, 1992). Therefore, the European 
Union  will  not  pass  laws  in  areas  that  are  better  covered  by  national,  regional  or  even  local 
procedures. 
 
2.  THE TRADITIONAL AND THE NEW OPPOSITION  
   
The ratification period of the Lisbon Treaty lasted from the 13
th of December 2007, the date it 
was signed, until the 1
st of December 2009, the day it came into force, thus being consistent in 
length with the average duration before a major European Union Treaty would usually become 
legally binding. Nevertheless, after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty became of paramount importance to the future of European construction and was 
carefully monitored by both politicians across Europe and citizens, by means of extensive media 
coverage. 
The  opposition  towards  the  adoption  of  the  Treaty,  in  direct  connection  with  the  two 
phenomena presented above - Euroscepticism and the Democratic Deficit - came from two major 
sides, which can fall into the categories of traditional and new opposition. The first of these poles 
includes countries where the anti-European sentiment is widely spread, namely Ireland and Great 
Britain. Of the two, the ratification process that nearly sealed the fate of the Reform Treaty occurred 
in the Republic of Ireland, the only member state bound by its national law to hold a referendum for 
                                                             
1 Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 9C, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00014.en07.pdf.  
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the ratification of the Treaty. It was to turn out that this referendum would prevent the Treaty from 
coming into force on the day it was supposed to, which was the 1
st of January 2009. 
Once  the  Lisbon  Treaty  was  signed,  Ireland  began  preparations  to  hold  the  referendum, 
according to the procedures laid down in its national Constitution. A positive sign at the time came 
from within the three-party governing coalition at the time, which expressed their support towards a 
positive  vote  in  the  upcoming  referendum,  while  only  two  nationalist  and  a  socialist  party 
proclaimed  their  opposition  to  the  Treaty.  Nevertheless,  amid  a  general  climate  of  suspicion 
towards the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty, the result of the referendum held on the 12
th of June 
2008 was against it, with 53.4% of the voters expressing a No vote and just a bit more than half the 
eligible voters participating in the ballot.
1 
Needless to say that the situation was a déjà vu of wha t had happened to the Constitutional 
Treaty three years before, in France and the Netherlands, causing anxiety throughout the European 
Union and especially in its institutional framework, all the more because the efforts made to create 
the new Institutional Treaty were considerable. The idea was that if the document was to be 
permanently rejected on that occasion, similarly to its predecessor, it was unclear whether there 
would be enough impetus left in the European Union to once again seek such an ambitious solution 
to the need for reform in the foreseeable future. 
The first step in overcoming this situation came once the results of the referendum were made 
public and prepared the public opinion for a second ballot, thus initiating a massive information 
campaign across the nation. The reason why this was needed is that a sociological analysis of the 
reasons why the Lisbon Treaty was rejected in Ireland in the first place showed beyond doubt that 
the number one cause  for this was the  insufficient  information  the population  had so as to 
understand the nature of the document. Hence, it comes to no surprise that a nation prone to a 
Eurosceptical attitude would be even more suspicious towards such a complex reform document if 
the information available about it was to be insufficient. This attitude is somewhat understandable, 
all  the  more  because  the  Treaty  itself  is  written  in  an  intricate  manner,  compared  to  the 
Constitutional, as this particular one had a unitary layout (Moussis, 2005), while the Lisbon Treaty, 
as an amending document, has countless references to other Treaties. This not only makes it 
difficult to read, but it also fuels up an already hostile internal climate, when it comes to the 
expansion of competences attributed to the supranational bodies of  the European Union (Kurpas, 
2007). 
                                                             
1 Ireland rejects EU reform treaty, BBC News, 13
th June 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7453560.stm.  
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A process of negotiation was therefore initiated not only between the Irish Government and 
its  citizens,  but  also  between  Ireland,  one  the  one  hand,  and  the  EU  institutions  and  decision 
makers, on the other hand. The purpose of these discussions was clearly to find a middle ground so 
as to guarantee that the national interests of Ireland are not violated in any way through the approval 
of the new Treaty, especially in a series of quite punctual matters. For example, Prime Minister 
Brian Cohen argued that the European Union should commit itself to some amendments to the 
Lisbon  Treaty,  which  should  be  included  in  the  next  Community  Treaty,  namely  Croatia’s 
upcoming accession Treaty. These  modifications referred to the right of every  member state to 
permanently have one Commissioner, as the Lisbon Treaty had originally intended to enhance the 
functioning of the decision making mechanism by reducing this number to 2/3 of that of member 
states. In addition to this, issues concerning abortion, taxation and a military status of neutrality 
were also on Cohen’s agenda, with the ultimate goal of gathering the required popular support for 
the upcoming referendum.
1 After receiving the official confirmation from Brussels that the desired 
amendments would be included in the next Community Treaty, Ireland held its second referendum 
on the Lisbon Treaty, on the 2
nd of October 2009, after a long period of reflection. The high hopes 
invested in this initiative finally paid off, as the Irish nation gave its approval to the Treaty of 
Lisbon by means of this second referendum, which resulted in a comfortable majority of Yes voters, 
with 67.1% of the total votes cast. In fact, the turnout was 6% higher at this second referendum that 
at the previous one, giving extra legitimacy to the result and taking a load off the shoulders of the 
artisans of the Reform Treaty, as well as of the European Union as a whole.
2 
Remaining in the area of traditional opposition towards the furtherance of EU reform, it is 
highly unlikely that Britain (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005, p.137 -138) should not be part of this 
analysis, although this topic did not hold the front pages of newspapers, as the Irish referenda did. 
The United Kingdom, in accordance with its national law, is   not legally bound to hold any 
referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, as this is not a Constitutional one, but merely an amending 
Treaty. Nevertheless, there was one case brought forward before the High Court of the UK asking 
for the approval of a referendum on the Treaty, based on previous declarations made by members of 
the British Government. However, the Government defended itself by stating that the promise under 
discussion was only valid with respect to the Constitutional Treaty and did not affect the newer  
document, all the more because the Treaty of Lisbon is, as it has been pointed out before, an 
amending Treaty. This point of view was upheld by the High Court, which ruled that the ratification 
                                                             
1 Brussels European Council 11/12 December 2008; Presidency Conclusions, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf. 
2 Ireland says “Yes” to Lisbon Treaty, Herald Scotland, 3
rd October 2009, 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/politics/ireland-says-yes-to-lisbon-treaty-1.923771.  
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procedure of the Treaty was legal and that there were no reasons to hold a referendum on the 
matter.
1 
Also in the area of experienced member states of the EU, it is worth mentioning that the 
ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty was jeopardized in Germany as well, where Eurosceptics 
turned once again to the weapon represented by the Constitutional Court, as it had occurred in the 
past as well. In a valuable opinion from the 30
th of June 2009, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany expressed the principles that the Treaty of Lisbon relied on, with special emphasis on the 
federal nature of the European Union and its compatibility with the German legal order. The most 
controversial issue in this respect was that on sovereignty, although the Court clearly stated that the 
democratic  deficit  within  the  EU  could  only  be  handled  through  the  diminishing  of  national 
sovereignty,  in  its  traditional  sense.  In  spite  of  this  need,  the  Court  concluded  that the  newly-
conceived reform process did not lead to the European Union becoming a federal state, thus there 
was no incompatibility between its provisions and those of the German Federal Constitution.
2 
Once this hurdle was overcome, the federal judges stated however that there were a few 
matters that should be dealt with prior to the ratification of the new Treaty. One of the se issues 
involved the right of the Budestag to exert a form of control over the votes cast by the members of 
the German Government within the Council of Ministers and other institutions  - a problem that 
refers to the internal order of Germany and not to the substance of the Treaty in any way. Moreover, 
the Court ruled that it had the right to overrule judgments issued by the European Court of Justice, 
if these did not comply with German law  - a more ambitious assert by Germany, but also a fair 
solution to  potential future claims meant to postpone the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In 
Germany, this did not occur, as, apart from these problems, there were no more obstacles in the way 
to ratification.
3 
If the abovementioned facts referred to what we wish to call “traditional opposition” towards 
the deepening of the process of European Integration, then the following aspects fall under the 
category of “new opposition”, depicting member states that lack experience within the European 
Community, but still express strong tendencies of Euroscepticism. The paradox is not difficult to 
notice  here,  as  after  long  and  tedious  negotiations  with  the  European  Commission  in  order  to 
become part of the Union, it should come as a surprise that these newly-admitted states (more 
precisely,  in  2004)  take  the  skeptical  approach  with  respect  to  the  future  of  the  transnational 
                                                             
1 Stuart Wheeler loses High Court challenge to the EU Lisbon Treaty, The Times, 26
th June 2008, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4214748.ece. 
2 Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon compatible with the Basic Law, Federal Constitutional Court Press Release 
72/2009, 30
th June 2009, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html. 
3Decision of the German Constitutional Court, 30.06.2009, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html.  
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organization  they  struggled  so  hard  to  enter.  Nevertheless,  the  subsequent  analysis  should  be 
understood in the ever changing context in international relations, to which it is worth adding the 
pressures triggered by the economic crisis and the alternation of governments in member states, 
each with its own perspective on what the European Union should look like. 
The Czech Republic is perhaps the most fervent Eurosceptical member state falling into the 
category of the “new opposition”, with a determined (and stubborn) leader as Vaclav Klaus, who 
opposed the Treaty of Lisbon in spite of the positive vote given to the document in Parliament. The 
attitude of the Czech President was not entirely a surprise at the time, as he had already made a 
public  statement  upon  the  rejection  of  the  Treaty  in  the  Irish  referendum  of  September  2008, 
pledging  not  to  sign  the  ratification  instrument  until  the  situation  had  been  rendered  clear. 
Nonetheless,  after  the  approval  of  the  document  by  the  Irish  nation,  following  the  second 
referendum, President Klaus continued to affirm his opposition towards the Lisbon Treaty, leading 
to another moment of crisis in its ratification process. 
The so-called weapon used by Vaclav Klaus to delay the ratification of the Reform Treaty 
was  mostly  the  Constitutional  Court  of  the  Czech  Republic.  With  the  support  of  a  group  of 
sympathetic  senators,  a  procedure  was  initialized  before  the  Court  so  as  to  attack  the 
constitutionality of several articles comprised in the Treaty. Under Czech law, a Treaty cannot be 
submitted to ratification while such a legal procedure is pending, which was the perfect excuse for 
Klaus  to  express  his  opposition  towards  the  Lisbon  Treaty  in  various  speeches.  As  the 
Constitutional  Court  conceded  that  those  particular  articles  of  the  Treaty  were  compliant  with 
Czech Law, the group of senators prepared a second procedure before the same Court, this time 
attacking the Treaty as a whole.
1 In fact, it was little more than a rather lame attempt to prolong a 
situation that was deemed to turn against the will of the Czech President sooner or later, especially 
given the reproaches made around the European Union as to the irrational opposition from Klaus. 
On the 3
rd of November 2009, roughly one month after the approval of the Lisbon Treaty by 
the Irish nation, the Czech Constitutional Court delivered its final verdict on the Treaty taken as a 
whole, stating that it was not incompatible with internal law, a verdict that proved to be decisive for 
its  ratification.  However,  prior  to  this  act,  President  Vaclav  Klaus  had  asked  for  one  more 
concession from the part of the European Union, this time regarding the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  More  precisely,  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  concerning  the  right  to  property  could 
allegedly  cause  a  conflict  with  the  Beneş  Decrees  emitted  right  after  World  War  Two,  which 
expropriated the possessions of German and Hungarian citizens on the territory of Czechoslovakia 
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without the  appropriate  compensations.
1  This argument was in fact far from being new in the 
political discourse of the Czech Republic, as it has already been raised by right -wing politicians 
while negotiations were under way for EU accession. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the extent 
to which these claims are genuine and whether it was nothing more than another diversion from 
Klaus, who intended to make a stand as a promoter of a strong sovereign Czech state. 
In reality, there are two  aspects that need to be considered in interpreting this situation. 
Firstly, the same Decrees that Klaus insisted on upholding are part of the national law of Slovakia 
too, a state that made no claim whatsoever with respect to the Charter of Human Rights. S econdly, 
and most importantly, the European Union itself asked for a legal opinion from the part of the 
European Court of Justice during the negotiation process in order to assess the compatibility 
problems between the Community Acquis and these legal acts. The answer was self-explanatory, as 
it emphasized on the temporal impossibility from the part of the European Union to challenge the 
validity of the Beneş Decrees, since they were enacted before the European Communities were 
created,  and  tempus  regit  actum.  This  means  that  any  measure  taken  by  the  EU  against  the 
abovementioned  Decrees  would  break  the  basic  principle  of  retroactivity,  thus  eliminating  the 
potential threat to the Czech Republic in this regard.
2 
In spite of this, Vaclav Klaus promised he would sign the ratification instrument of the Lisbon 
Treaty on approval of this claim, which was conceded to him and led to his signing the Treaty on 
the day the Constitutional Court delivered its final verdict on the legality of the document, namely 
the 3
rd of November 2009. Ten days later, the ratification document made its way to the Italian 
Government, marking the completion of the intricate ratification process in the Czech Republic and 
in the European Union as well and enabling the Treaty to come into force on the first day of the 
following month, as stipulated within it. 
Although  less  energetic  than  the  Czech  opposition,  Poland  expressed  a  similar  attitude 
towards the Treaty of Lisbon in the course of its ratification, thus it is worth including it into the 
category  of  the  “new  opposition”.  It  was  the  late  President’s  Lech  Kaczynski  who  expressed 
publically, after the failed referendum in Ireland, that he had no intention of posing his signature on 
the document, until the situation was clarified. In the meantime, various discussions were conducted 
in Polish politics, which led to the signing of a protocol to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, next to Great Britain, making this document virtually inapplicable in Polish legal 
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courts.  This  is  because  the  provisions  of  the  Charter  are  rendered  non-mandatory  for  the  two 
countries, especially the title referring to social and economic rights, which cannot be invoked in 
domestic courts as a consequence. For Poland, the arguments that were most frequently invoked 
pertained to social and ethical issues regarded as traditional, such as same-sex marriage, contrary to 
the UK, where the main point of concern was the extended right of workers to go on strike. 
Internally,  the  perspective  taken  by  Poland  with  regard  to  the  Lisbon  Treaty  was  quite 
complex, as the ruling party, led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk, had initially expressed its support 
for the Charter, in contrast with the Kaczynski brothers’ Law and Justice Party. Nevertheless, the 
situation was more complicated than that, given that the Government needed the support of this 
party to achieve the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in the Polish Parliament, which made Tusk 
change his initial attitude towards it. On the other hand, it is likely that Poland will eventually adopt 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the future, as Donald Tusk himself implied.
1 
It was the second referendum on the Reform Treaty in Ireland, in October 2009, which 
determined President Kaczynski to sign the ratification instrument, leaving the fate of the Treaty in 
the hands of the last two countries that had not completed the process at the time, namely Ireland 




3.  THE RATIFICATION PROCEDURE 
 
The  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  as  in  the  case  of  other  European  Community/Union  Treaties,  was 
submitted to a sinuous process of ratification, before it finally became legally binding, on the 1
st of 
December  2009,  almost  one  year  later  than  it  had  been  expected  to.  There  are  various 
considerations that need to be made with regard to this process, so as to comprehend the reason why 
it took member states to long to get the necessary “paperwork” done, as well as the hurdles that had 
to be overcome along the way. 
There  are  various  steps  that  together  form  the  lifeline  of  an  international  Treaty,  some 
encountered in the case of European Treaties as well, while others are particular traits of the latter. 
First, the signing and ratification procedures have to comply with international law, making them 
safe from subsequent challenges from the part of their opponents. Therefore, the most important 
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steps undergone by the Treaty of Lisbon commenced with the drafting phase, which was conducted 
under  the  auspices  of  the  European  Council.  The  summit  of  Brussels  in  the  summer  of  2007 
mandated an Intergovernmental Conference to prepare the draft of the new Reform Treaty, as it has 
occurred with previous such documents within the European Union. The purpose of this mandate is 
to provide the instance chosen to find the appropriate formulation for the Treaty with legitimacy, 
thus proving that the latter reflects the will of the member states. Contrary to national procedures in 
democratic  states,  however,  this  mandate  was  not  conferred  to  the  Constituent  Assembly  by 
Parliament, which represents the will of the people (in this case, the European Parliament), because 
in the case of the European Union, it is customary that the intergovernmental element at its highest 
level should be the one providing the impetus for further reform (Mads and Usher, 2003, p.240-
241). 
The following step in the evolution of the draft was for the Conference to choose the nature of 
the  Treaty  and  the  different  approach  taken  by  it,  in  comparison  with  its  predecessor,  the 
Constitutional Treaty. More precisely, it was decided that the new Treaty should not aspire to the 
status of a Constitution, so as not to fall into the same trap as its precursor. In exchange, the new 
document was given the name of Reform Treaty, which it would bear even today, had it not been 
for  the  Portuguese  capital  hosting  its  signing  in  December  2007.  Along  with  its  name,  it  was 
decided that the form of the new Treaty should be that of an amending one, which would replace 
articles  from  both  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  henceforth  named  “Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the 
European Union” and the Treaty of Maastricht, still referred to as the “Treaty on the European 
Union”. 
Furthermore, the  panel  of  experts  that  created the  text of  the  new  Treaty  had  to  find  an 
appropriate formula to make the text of the Charter of Human Rights
1 legally binding, without 
making  this  too obvious,  so  as  not to openly  confront the  opposition  that  had  rejected  the  
Constitutional Treaty on these grounds - amongst others - in France and the Netherlands (Pécheul, 
2008, p.101-102). Whilst this document included the text of the Charter as a national Constitution 
would normally do, it was decided that such a measure shou ld be avoided in the new Treaty, but 
without abandoning the Charter, which awaited its empowerment since its approval in 2000  (Mads 
and Usher, 2003, p.399). The formula that was agreed upon was that of having a single article 
embedded in the text of the Treaty, which would give legal value to the Charter, a measure that is 
both effective and discrete, and does not bring the European Union much closer to a super -state, as 
the opposition might have argued. 
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The Intergovernmental Conference in charge of drafting the Treaty had as a solid starting 
point  the  project  presented  to  it  by  the  Portuguese  Presidency  of  the  European  Union  (July-
December 2007), bearing the name of “Draft Treaty Amending the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community”.
1 In order to make sure that transparency was 
guaranteed  at  all  times,  the  draft  was  made  public  on  the  Council  of  Ministers’  website  and 
subjected to public debate. Moreover, along with scholars and political representatives from all the 
member states, the workgroup also included three members delegated by the European Parliament, 
in order to represent the supranational interests of this institution. The work of the Conference was 
far from simple, as countless pressures from the part of member  states, such as Poland and the 
Netherlands, exerted their influence on the final shape of the Treaty’s draft. 
It was the October 2007 European Council in Lisbon, led by Portuguese Prime Minister José 
Sócrates, at the time President of the Council, that the final adjustments were made to the future 
Treaty of  Lisbon,  based on Polish claims to benefit  from a  cushion period until  new qualified 
majority voting rules were applied in the Council of Ministers. This new form of the old Ioannina 
Compromise (Sauron, p.44-45), along with the nomination by Poland of an Advocate General at the 
European Court of Justice, guaranteed the Polish support, needed to sign the Reform Treaty the 
following month.
2 Indeed, on the 13
th of December 2007, the much-awaited day of the official 
signing ceremony came, regrouping executive leaders from all the member states, with a temporary 
absence of British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who put his signature on the Treaty a few hours 
later.  Given  that  the  Portuguese  capital  hosted  the  ceremony,  more  precisely  the  picturesque 
Jerónimos Monastery, the Reform Treaty was permanently given the unofficial name of Lisbon 
Treaty, in light of the European Union’s tradition in this regard. 
Apart from the brotherhood atmosphere and the symbolism of this event, as shown in the 
traditional  “family  photo”  of  all  the  participants  (including  the  Presidents  of  the  European 
Parliament, Commission and Council), the moment started a chain of events that proved to be hard 
to predict, let alone control, before the Treaty of Lisbon finally became law two years after its 
signature. The procedure of ratifying the freshly-signed Treaty was similar to that of previous such 
documents,  and  consisted  of  two  major  steps.  The  first  was  for  member  states  to  undergo  a 
parliamentary ratification process, according to national regulations, followed by the signing of the 
ratification  instrument by their  head of state. The  second step was  merely a  formal one and  it 
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consisted of deposing the ratification file with the Government of Italy, which had been chosen for 
this task.
1 
As previously mentioned, by then, the regulations of each member state but one stipulated or 
had been changed so that national parliaments were allowed to vote for the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty. Nevertheless, the Republic of Ireland was compelled by domestic law to hold a referendum 
for the approval of the Treaty, while other member states, despite rumours and previous public 
statements invoking potential referenda as well, did not recur to this instrument. 
The very first member state to have ratified the document was Hungary, whose legislative 
expressed  a  categorical  “yes”  for  it  no  later  than  four  days  after  its  signing,  which  seems 
extraordinary  for  such  a  complicated  endeavour.  For  the  procedure  to  be  complete,  Hungary 
finalized the ratification process on the 6
th of February 2008
2, once the ratification instrument, with 
the Presidential assent granted, was deposited at the Italian Government. 
The other  member states followed Hungary in the ratification effort, so that by the end of 
2008, all but four member states had deposited their files. This did not mean, however, that the 
Treaty of Lisbon had a green light to come into force, as it needed to be rati fied by all of the EU 
members before it could become law  -  and at least three of the four countries failing to act 
positively on it by 2009 were raising serious questions as to whether they would ever complete the 
process. While this was not the case of Ge rmany, where support for the Treaty at the highest 
political level was reassuring, Poland, the Czech Republic and Ireland each posed severe problems 
in terms of ratification, as it has been pictured above. 
On the other hand, there were two countries that h ad ratified the Lisbon Treaty with an 
absolute majority in their respective parliaments, namely Italy (in both the Chamber of Deputies 
and Senate)
3 and Malta
4, with the rest approving the document with a comfortable majority (as in 
the case of Romania, where only one vote was cast against the Treaty and another MP abstained 
from voting). The closest vote was expressed, as expected, in the British House of Commons, but 
not even there was the ratification process even close to a standstill, with a difference of almost 150 
MPs between those supporting the Treaty and those voting against it.
5 
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The last ratification instrument to be deposited was that of the Czech Republic, on the 13
th of 
November 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon stipulated that it would come into force only on the first day 
of the month following this event, which meant that the 1
st of December 2009 was the day the 
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